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8-560

IAC AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE REQUIREMENTS

28 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman,  
Guided Missile Intelligence Committee

Subject: Soviet Guided Missile Requirements





Enclosed are fifteen (15) copies each of the Requirements Working Group's contribution to NIE 11-5-58 covering space vehicles and an introduction for the entire contribution. This concludes the contribution from the working group.



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Enclosures (2)

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
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SOVIET REQUIREMENTS FOR SPACE VEHICLES

1. Soviet goals and objectives relating to space vehicles cannot be regarded as requirements in the usual sense of weapon systems needed to oppose or counterbalance an enemy's military capabilities. In the field of guided missiles, it is appropriate to estimate requirements on the basis of existing or foreseeable military strengths which either pose a threat to be defended against or constitute a defense to be surmounted. Requirements for space vehicles cannot be confined to military purposes and their potential military value may be neither the primary consideration nor present at all in deciding whether and what kind of space vehicles should be developed. The ultimate objective of the USSR in the field of space vehicles is undoubtedly the attainment of manned space travel at least on an interplanetary scale. The underlying motive is the realization of substantial benefits from the tremendous potential of prestige and knowledge inherent in such development. However, shorter term objectives would guide Soviet efforts during the period of this estimate and, in most cases, requirements for space vehicles would be established for fairly specific purposes, including military use, but with the full recognition that other desiderata would be realized as a by-product.

Unmanned Earth Satellites

2. There is a current requirement, continuing throughout the period of the estimate, for unmanned earth satellite systems



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3. Being the first to achieve any of the above requirements would also be politically advantageous in furthering Soviet prestige, providing the accomplishment were made known.

#### Unmanned Moon Rocket


4. There is a current requirement, largely political, for an unmanned rocket to impact on the moon or to orbit the moon and return to earth. Fulfillment of this requirement would also produce useful scientific data.

#### Manned Satellite

5. There is a current political and scientific requirement to orbit and recover a manned satellite.

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6. A necessary developmental step, and quite possibly a continuing requirement in its advanced form, will be a manned space vehicle capable of penetrating outer space for a limited period of time with a significant payload and returning safely to a predetermined point on earth under its own power. Such a vehicle will be required for the construction and operation of a manned satellite space station (see below) and eventually for the establishment of a lunar base.

#### Manned Satellite Space Stations

7. A requirement will exist from both a political and a scientific standpoint, for the establishment of permanent

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manned satellite stations at a considerable distance (upwards of 1,000 miles) from the surface of the earth. Of immediate value for scientific observation purposes, these stations, enlarged and improved, may be used eventually as intermediate stations for lunar and interplanetary travel and space vehicle construction.

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28 March 1958

## SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE REQUIREMENTS

In estimating Soviet missile requirements, we have proceeded on the basis of two general assumptions: 1) that there will be no international agreement on control of outer space or limitation of armaments, and (2) that the USSR would plan for general war even though it has no intention of initiating general war and deliberately avoids courses of action which incur grave risk of leading to general war.

The first assumption implies that the USSR will not be restrained by treaty obligations in developing, producing, or introducing into operational units any missile systems which it regards as necessary or desirable for the achievement of Soviet objectives. The second assumption, which is consistent with our estimates of likely Soviet courses of action in the next five years, implies that the USSR would establish missile requirements for general war, but does not imply that it would go beyond the design and feasibility stage for any particular missile system considered by Soviet military planners or for all missile systems which they decide are required. Some missile systems will certainly be developed beyond the stage of feasibility tests, produced in quantity, and introduced into operational units. But which ones will be pushed and how far the USSR will attempt to go in any particular category of missiles depends on Soviet technical and economic capabilities, the relative priority of competing demands on those capabilities, and the strategy adopted to carry out their intentions. Accordingly, the missile requirements outlined herein, even if they are all

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within Soviet capabilities, do not necessarily indicate the most probable assortment of missiles that the USSR will develop and produce.

In regard to Soviet capabilities, we have not explicitly eliminated any requirement on the grounds that it cannot be met by a certain time or during the period of this estimate. The controlling factor is the nature and time-phase of Western capabilities as seen by the USSR. Consequently, some of the estimated requirements might be beyond Soviet capabilities during the period 1958-1966, while others might be within their technical capabilities but not attainable soon enough to meet the threat. Similarly, economic limitations might prevent the USSR from producing certain missiles or associated equipment in significant operational quantities, but we have not eliminated the requirement for this reason.

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